Double Government / Trumanite Network
Edition label: 2026-10
Definition: Michael Glennon’s framework describing the bifurcation of U.S. governance into visible “Madisonian” institutions that provide constitutional legitimacy but exercise little real constraint1, and a concealed “Trumanite network” of several hundred senior national security officials that makes actual policy. Named by analogy to Walter Bagehot’s 1867 analysis of British constitutional duality.2
Overview
Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution distinguishes the parts of government that command public reverence from the parts that actually govern.3 Bagehot argued that this duality was self-sustaining as long as the public believed the dignified institutions were in charge.4
Michael Glennon applied this framework to U.S. national security in a 2014 article in the Harvard National Security Journal.
The Trumanite network consists of several hundred senior executive officials who manage the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies responsible for national security.5 Glennon describes a network including careerists and political appointees.6 His comparison of 247 appointees with 668,000 civilian employees refers to the Department of Defense and related agencies in 2004.7
The Trumanite Network — Origins and Operation
Origins: The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA8, the statutory Joint Chiefs of Staff9 and the National Security Council;10 the NSA was established separately by Truman’s 1952 directive.11 Harry Truman, who feared military overreach, nonetheless created the apparatus.12 Conservative Republicans at the time warned it would produce a “garrison state.”13 Congress named the agency in a 1959 public law (Pub. L. 86-36)14, and it drew sustained public attention only in the 1970s, when the Church Committee disclosed its watch list of Vietnam War opponents.
Scale: Priest and Arkin’s 2010 Top Secret America investigation identified 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies working on counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 U.S. locations, and estimated that 854,000 people held top-secret clearances.15
Structural Incentive to Exaggerate Threats: The network’s structural feature is an asymmetric cost structure.16 Overprotection costs (spending too much, surveilling too broadly, treating adversaries as more dangerous than they are) are externalized — taxpayers bear them. Underprotection costs (missing an attack, failing to prevent a threat) are internalized — Trumanites are blamed.17 This creates a rational incentive to exaggerate threats, expand programs, and resist retrenchment.18 Glennon, citing Sanger, reports that in the decade after 9/11 the United States spent at least $3.3 trillion responding to the attacks, or $6.6 million for every dollar al-Qaeda spent to stage them.19
Secrecy Culture: Non-disclosure agreements, SCIF culture, over-classification, and aggressive whistleblower prosecution combine to create an information asymmetry that prevents meaningful oversight. Glennon cites Balkin’s characterization of the network as comprising “information gluttons and information misers.”20
Conformism: The network’s grundnorm is stability.21 For an ambitious Trumanite, Glennon describes proposing the continuation of existing policy as the safe course.22 Frank Church described national security policy as a “self-generating enterprise.”23 Dissenters risk marginalization.24
The Madisonian Institutions — Sources of Illusion
Five elements maintain the appearance of Madisonian control, even while the Madisonians exercise little real power: (1) historical pedigree (the visible institutions have deep constitutional roots);25 (2) solemn ritual (confirmation hearings, State of the Union, oral argument); (3) intelligibility (Madisonian proceedings are public and comprehensible);26 (4) mystery (Madisonian officials operate at a remove from the public, and what happens in their deliberations is “shrouded in mystery”);27 (5) superficial harmony (Madisonian statements closely track Trumanite policies, creating appearance of alignment).28
“The Trumanite network makes American national security policy; it is occasional exceptions to that policy that are made by the Madisonian institutions.”29 — Glennon
Judicial Capture
Federal judiciary nominees in national security-adjacent roles are effectively pre-vetted by the apparatus whose cases they will later adjudicate.30 Glennon traces the careers of Rehnquist (OLC, military surveillance, Laird v. Tatum non-recusal), Scalia (OLC, covert operations), Alito (Army Signal Corps → OLC → presidential power positions), and Roberts (Rehnquist clerk, strong executive positions) as examples of capture through selection.31
The FISC approved 32,087 of 32,093 warrant requests between 1979 and 2011 — a 99.98% approval rate.32 Chief Judge Walton acknowledged the FISC “is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is provided to the Court.”33 In 2011, Chief Judge Bates issued a declassified opinion finding that NSA’s representations had constituted “the third instance in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program.”34 Bates’s 2011 footnote recounts the court’s March 2009 finding that the required metadata-querying standard, a critical element of the regime, had never functioned effectively.35
Non-delegation doctrine is never enforced in national security;36 state secrets doctrine eliminates merits adjudication;37 standing doctrine barriers prevent suits from reaching the merits.38
Congressional Capture
Trumanites draft national security legislation, then present it to Congress.39 The legislative veto — the mechanism by which Congress could claw back delegated authority — was invalidated by INS v. Chadha (1983).40 The 9/11 Commission found oversight “dysfunctional.”41 As Glennon quotes James Bamford, “the intelligence committees are more dedicated to protecting the agencies from budget cuts than safeguarding the public from their transgressions.”42 Committee and chamber rules condition the sharing of classified information with other Members; access may be denied, partial, or full.43
The Senate Intelligence Committee Chair, Dianne Feinstein, (1) confirmed she had no knowledge of how the NSA actually used the phone records it collected; (2) stated it was nonetheless important to collect records in case someone might become a terrorist in the future — a rationale the New York Times called “absurd”.44
Clapper’s March 2013 testimony to Wyden — “No, sir” to the question whether NSA collected data on millions of Americans — later admitted by Clapper to be “the least untruthful” statement he could give, was potentially a felony (18 U.S.C. § 1001).45
When all Senators were invited to a classified briefing on NSA programs following the Snowden disclosures, fewer than half attended.46 The House Intelligence Committee Chair, Rep. Mike Rogers, stated in debate over restricting the bulk phone records collection program: “we the intelligence community—missed a huge clue.”47 Glennon concludes that “the overseers and the overseen had, at length, become one”;48 the Senate Intelligence Committee chair’s March 2014 public challenge to CIA conduct is a counterexample.
Presidential Capture
Trumanites formulate the options that presidents nominally choose.49 Glennon quotes Secretary Robert Gates calling this “the classic Henry Kissinger model” — three options presented, two of them ridiculous.50 Presidents discover that “could not” and “would not” shade into each other.51
- Afghanistan: Glennon, citing Woodward, recounts that when Obama asked the eighteen top advisers at an Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review meeting, “Is there anybody who thinks we ought to leave Afghanistan?”, no one said anything.52
- Drone policy: Continued unanimously by CIA, DNI, Pentagon, and Brennan.53
- Robert Gates case study: CIA 1965 → NSC under Nixon/Ford → Casey chief of staff (1981) → Iran-Contra blocked nomination → returned to the White House in January 1989 as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs → confirmed as CIA DCI 1991 → SecDef under George W. Bush (2006–2009) → SecDef under Obama (2009–2011).54 Gates served both administrations without interruption, a textbook example of Trumanite continuity across presidential transitions.55
NSA Case Study
- 1952: NSA established by a Top Secret directive issued by President Truman56
- 1975: Church Committee disclosed NSA watch-list and SHAMROCK activity; Senator Hart said SHAMROCK appeared unlawful under section 605 and the Fourth Amendment, while noting no case exactly in point.57
- 1978: FISA enacted as post-Church reform; created FISC58
- Pre-9/11: NSA Director Hayden proposed further expansion59
- October 4, 2001: President George W. Bush issued a Top Secret authorization directing that NSA signals-intelligence capabilities be used to detect and prevent further attacks inside the United States (the start of the President’s Surveillance Program).60
- March 2004: Ashcroft refusal to re-authorize; Comey/Goldsmith confrontation
- July 14, 2004: the FISC signed the first pen-register/trap-and-trace order, giving NSA essentially the same authority to collect bulk Internet metadata it had had under the President’s Surveillance Program;61 other program activities moved under FISA court orders in stages through January 2007.62
- December 16, 2005: NYT disclosed warrantless surveillance (held >1 year at Bush administration request)63
- 2008: FISA Amendments Act, §70264; PRISM program authorized65; Obama continued66
- March 2013: Clapper gives testimony to Feinstein’s committee that he later acknowledges was erroneous67
- June 2013: Snowden disclosures68
- July 2013: House defeated Amash-Conyers amendment to terminate bulk collection 205-217; Obama administration allied with House Republican leadership to defeat it69
Future Risk Scenarios
Glennon identifies two possible trajectories if Bagehot’s “cone of governance” tips:
Gradual: Madisonian institutions fade into museum pieces like the British House of Lords; Madisonians “kiss babies, cut ribbons, and read Trumanite talking points”; the Trumanite network “takes on the substance of a silent directorate.”70
Catastrophic: A major terrorist attack occurs in the absence of Madisonian safety-valve checks.71 Initial “rally round the flag” fervor is followed by escalating mutual recrimination, criminalization of dissent, and governmental surveillance of the public.72 Historical precedents cited: Alien and Sedition Acts (1790s), Palmer Raids (1919–20), Japanese-American internment (1940s), governmental spying on and disruption of civil rights, draft protesters, and anti-war activists (1960s–70s), post-9/11 “unlawful combatant” incommunicado detention.73
The negative feedback loop: Resuscitating Madisonian institutions requires an informed, engaged electorate.74 But voters have rational reasons not to become informed when national security policy persists unchanged regardless of electoral outcomes.75 As the public disengages, Madisonian institutions atrophy further, accelerating the cycle.76
Intellectual Antecedents
Glennon situates his framework within a larger body of thought on bureaucracy, power, and democratic accountability: - Max Weber: bureaucratization can lead to “polar night of icy darkness” where humanitarian values are sacrificed for abstract organizational ends77 - Friedrich Hayek (as quoted by Glennon): “the greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in government, namely, the efficient expert administrators”78 - Erich Fromm: people unconsciously adopt societal norms to “escape from freedom”79 - Irving Janis: high esprit de corps increases groupthink risk; “irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups”80 - C. Wright Mills: The Power Elite (1956); centralization among officials sharing a worldview who operate in secrecy → “military metaphysics” and “permanent war economy”81 - Malcolm Moos / Eisenhower: Moos, Eisenhower’s speechwriter, was familiar with Mills’s work; Eisenhower’s Farewell Address (January 17, 1961) warned of “unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex”82
Related Concepts
- Congressional Oversight of Covert Action — Glennon provides the structural explanation for why statutory oversight reforms (Hughes-Ryan, FISA, Gang of Eight) underperform; complements the McCubbins-Schwartz “fire alarm” analysis showing why fire alarm fails in national security contexts
- Imperial Presidency — Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (author of The Imperial Presidency, 1973) documented the presidency as the accumulator of power; Glennon inverts this — the presidency is also captured by the Trumanite network, which formulates the choices presidents nominally make83
- FISC / FISA Court — Glennon’s discussion of judicial oversight and the FISC
- Covert Action Oversight Framework — Trumanite capture of oversight committees provides structural context for recurring failures of statutory covert-action oversight
Related Entities
- Michael J. Glennon — author; also wrote Constitutional Diplomacy (1990) and The Fog of Law (2010)
- James Clapper — exemplifies false intelligence testimony
- Dianne Feinstein — Feinstein’s NSA oversight record is criticized in Glennon’s account; her March 2014 floor statement also documents a public challenge to CIA conduct.84
- Michael Hayden — NSA Director who proposed expansion pre-9/11; later CIA DCI
Open Questions
- What evidence, if any, would connect the institutions in Glennon’s framework to decisions concerning Epstein’s non-prosecution agreement, and how would it distinguish that explanation from other accounts?
- How does Glennon’s structural framework account for intentional concealment as well as institutional incentives, and what tests could distinguish those mechanisms?
- How should Walsh’s account of covert evasion of post-Watergate oversight rules85 inform an assessment of reforms’ effectiveness, and what distinguishes reforms that constrain executive conduct from those that do not?
- How was Hayden’s proposed pre-9/11 expansion received, and what evidence would establish whether it was resisted?
- When does the political-question doctrine foreclose national-security litigation, and does its operation differ from standing barriers?
- Beyond the marginalization of dissenters described by Glennon,86 what evidence links support for existing policies to promotion within the network?
- How does the mixed network of careerists and political appointees Glennon describes87 trace its institutional lineage to the National Security Act of 1947?
- Was any criminal referral or inquiry under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 opened concerning DNI Clapper’s March 2013 answer to Senator Wyden, and what was its outcome?
- What had Senator Feinstein been told about the NSA’s bulk collection before DNI Clapper’s March 2013 answer to Senator Wyden, and how did she respond to that answer at the hearing?
- Did President Obama state drone-policy preferences that differed from the unanimous advice of the CIA, DNI, Pentagon and Brennan, and how did the policy that continued compare with those preferences?
- When was the May 2012 NSA compliance audit reporting 2,776 incidents made public, and what categories of incidents does that figure count?
Sources
- Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution. Text with introduction to the second edition, dated June 20, 1872. Project Gutenberg eBook 4351, updated December 11, 2016.
- Clapper, James R. Letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein correcting March 12, 2013 testimony. June 21, 2013. National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 436, document 82.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Farewell Address.” January 17, 1961. National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address.
- Feinstein, Dianne. “CIA Detention and Interrogation Report.” Senate floor statement. Congressional Record 160, no. 40 (March 11, 2014): S1487–S1491.
- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Memorandum Opinion (Bates, J.). October 3, 2011.
- Fromm, Erich. The Fear of Freedom. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1942.
- Glennon, Michael J. “National Security and Double Government.” Harvard National Security Journal 5 (2014): 1–114.
- INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
- Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Report on the President’s Surveillance Program. July 10, 2009. Redacted release in New York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 14 Civ. 3776 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.), April 24, 2015.
- Kaiser, Frederick M. Protection of Classified Information by Congress: Practices and Proposals. CRS Report RS20748. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 31, 2011.
- Leonnig, Carol D. “Court: Ability to police U.S. spying program limited.” Washington Post, August 15, 2013.
- Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. 1956. Reprint, Galaxy paperback ed., Oxford University Press, 1959.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 22, 2004.
- National Security Agency, Office of the Inspector General. Working Draft: Report on the President’s Surveillance Program, ST-09-0002. March 24, 2009. Unauthorized disclosure, published June 27, 2013.
- Priest, Dana, and William M. Arkin. “A Hidden World, Growing beyond Control.” Washington Post, July 19, 2010. Top Secret America, part 1.
- Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Washington, DC, July 2, 2014.
- Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Washington, DC, January 23, 2014.
- U.S. Congress. National Security Act of 1947. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (July 26, 1947), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Nomination of Robert M. Gates, to Be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearings. Vol. 1. S. Hrg. 102-799. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 17, 19, and 20, 1991. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992.
- U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities: The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights. Hearings, Vol. 5, 94th Cong., 1st sess., October 29 and November 6, 1975. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
- U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. Final Report, Book III. S. Rep. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 23, 1976.
- Walsh, Lawrence E. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Vol. I: Investigations and Prosecutions. Submitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsel (Division No. 86-6). Washington, DC, August 4, 1993.
- Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford University Press, 1946.